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Gang GUO
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
Sunday, June 18th, 2000
C. Chinese citizens seeking to influence government outcomes in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan face different constraints in their political environments. From the perspective of the individual citizen, institutions such as interest groups, political parties, and informal networks and activities such as voting and protesting offer different sorts of opportunities for exercising influence in the three systems. Choose three of these institutions or activities and compare their role and effectiveness in influencing government outcomes across the systems.
Interest Groups
In mainland China, the institutional constraints on individual citizen's political participation are the most severe among the three Chinese political systems. This is reflected in the role and effectiveness of interest groups in mainland China. As the theoretical premise of a Leninist party state system puts it, the Communist Party is an enlightened revolutionary vanguard that alone is able to understand and represent the objective long-term interests of the masses. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party monopolizes the function of interest aggregation in the society, and does not allow (at least not since the end of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution") any formal organization of like interests to form outside of the party (Manion 1999:58). Any such independently organized groups that attempt to articulate autonomous interests of their members will be ruthlessly suppressed, even in the case of such ostensibly innocuous groups as the Falun Gong, which, ironically, was better organized at the grassroots level than the Communist Party is. The dominant party organizations penetrate all levels of society and exercise close control over all such associational groups as are permitted to exist (Almond and Powell 1996:91). These "mass organizations" such as trade unions, women's federation, youth league, etc., are completely subordinated to the Communist Party. The "main function of mass organizations is not to aggregate and represent group interests for consideration in the policymaking process, but to facilitate propagation of party policy to the relevant groups" (Manion 1999:60).
Under these severe constraints, from an individual citizen's perspective, s/he has to sometimes rely on alternative channels of interest groups to articulate individual interests. The first three types of interest groups enumerated by Almond and Powell, individual contactors, anomic groups, and non-associational groups (1996:85), are frequently used by ordinary citizens. However, in the mainland China political context, they are mostly aimed at rectifying local problems, not at influencing policymaking. Another channel with similar aim is the administrative litigation, which, according to Pei (1997:833), provides ordinary citizens with a legal basis for adjudicating disputes between citizens and the government over various administrative decisions. According to O'Brien, this would constitute a form of "rightful resistance", which "entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values to defy 'disloyal' political and economic elites" (1996:33). This form of interest articulation and aggregation, according to Pei and O'Brien, is playing an increasingly important role and becoming more effective in mainland China, despite the fact that it's "mindful and circumscribed" in nature (O'Brien 1996:53).
In the case of Hong Kong, the political system has fewer and less severe constraints on the role and effectiveness of interest groups than in the mainland. The civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law also provide a better environment for the flourishing of interest groups. Historically, Britain ruled Hong Kong as a colony from 1841 to 1984 without a democratic form of government (Chan 1994:161). In 1982, the introduction of District Board elections stimulated the political participation of some pressure groups, and the December 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration further increased the activities of the interest groups in Hong Kong. According to Lo (1997:138), "the groups functioned as pressure groups which 'promote their interests by attempting to influence government rather than by nominating candidates and seeking responsibility for the management of government'. But the real "explosion of civil society" came during and after China's liberalization from 1987 to 1989, and the Tiananman tragedy triggered the emergence of even more pro-democracy groups. In understanding interest groups' role and effectiveness in Hong Kong, we have to first note two peculiarities about them: first, they are organized most prominently along class lines; second, Hong Kong's autonomy from mainland China and thus its democratic development are the main field of contention for the major interest groups. The conservative big business elite forms the major pro-PRC and anti-democratic interest groups (Chan 1994:166), while the intellectual elite and middle-class liberals form pro-democracy groups (Lo 1997:139). According to Lo, "not only did these pro-democracy groups serve the educative function of cultivating democratic values among Hongkongers, they also had the unintended consequence of assisting the government to implement civic education which had long been neglected by colonial policy-makers before the 1980s (1997: 172). Judging from the description by Miners on Hong Kong's pressure groups, it seems their influence on government outcomes is mainly through the intimate contact and consultation between government and pressure groups *before* government decisions are made (1998:188). This is apparently different from the above mentioned pattern of interest group influence in the mainland. Another feature of Hong Kong's interest group politics is that this "system favors the richer business and employer groups".
Taiwan, governed by a hierarchically-organized Leninist party, the Nationalists, from 1945 to this May, has a different pattern of interest group participation, due to its ongoing process of democratization. Since the lifting of martial law and of the ban on opposition political parties in the 1980s, Taiwan has seen a transformation from an authoritarian Leninist party-state to a fledgling democracy. The mobilization of various social movements in the 1980s loosened the authoritarian state's grip on civil society at the grassroots level. For example, within a year or so after the lifting of the martial law, there were an explosion of farmers' associations and activism in Taiwan (Hsiao 1994:207). In many modernized socio-economic sectors, there was a rollback of state penetration and a refurbishment of the social fabric of civil society. Intellectuals, religious groups, middle-class public-interest groups, professional associations, and college students now occupy public space in a relatively unhindered manner. The influence of the state over many key social sectors -- business and industry, labor, the mass media, schools, and state employees -- has manifestly receded. While organizational links between social movements and the opposition parties remain tenuous, the former have provided fertile soil in which opposition politics can take root (Chu 1996:74). Therefore, Taiwan seems to be developing a plural interest group system, as defined by Almond and Powell (1996: 89).
Political Parties
In mainland China, as above mentioned, the Communist Party monopolizes the function of interest aggregation in society. The party permits, but no longer encourages, political participation by ordinary citizens through officially recognized proper channels, such as offices of letters and visits, centers and telephone hotlines, or maybe even discussion forums on the Internet. From an ordinary citizen's perspective, under most circumstances these channels through the Communist Party to influence government policy outcomes play less significant roles and are less effective than other forms of political participation such as personal contacting. Also in mainland China there are eight "satellite parties" that are political "parties" only in name and are more similar to the "mass organizations" mentioned above, performing similar functions of facilitating policy implementation. Therefore they play very limited part in policymaking, although in some work units or localities they may become effective channels in the Communist Party's consultation according to the "mass line". Opposition parties in mainland China can only operate underground, and activists and supporters are subject to swift and severe punishment (People's Daily 1998.12.22).
In Hong Kong, the legal and political environments are less constrained for a competitive party system than in mainland China. The one major constraint, however, as Newman pointed out, is the well understood institutional arrangement in which political parties, either under British colonial administration or Chinese rule, are permanently relegated to a role of loyal opposition (Newman 1999:13). Political parties in Hong Kong also tend to be relatively new and volatile, not yet entrenched organizations, although they are highly vocal, articulate, vigorous and (for the most part) organizationally autonomous (Baum 1999:1, 29). According to Newman, the introduction of geographic constituency elections in 1991 for the Legislative Council elections made contesting for seats in Hong Kong meaningful and gave rise to the convention of interest groups into political parties (1999:8). Since then, it is well acknowledged in Hong Kong that political parties play an increasingly important role in the political system and are almost indispensable in elections (Louie 1997:7). That political parties play important roles in Hong Kong's political system can also be seen from Louie's finding that the five major parties in Hong Kong are recognized as best representing the interests of the Hong Kong people by 38.8% of all the registered electors and by 47.2% of those who turned out to vote in the 1995 Legislative Council election (1997:22). Ordinary citizens not only know the major political parties very well, but also have consistent attitude toward the parties. The political parties' effectiveness in influencing government policymaking, however, seems limited, as Hong Kong Special Administrative Region remains an executive-dominated political system. As Miners points out, the "powers of members" of the Legislative Council after 1997 are even more limited than they were before (1998:153). For example, Article 76 of the Basic Law stipulated that "A bill passed by the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take effect only after it is signed and promulgated by the Chief Executive". Therefore, in the legislative chamber speeches are more likely to be directed towards the electorate outside than to be attempts to persuade the government to change its mind (Miners 1998:202).
Taiwan also features a competitive party system as Hong Kong's, but Taiwan's political parties are more entrenched political organizations that are also more effective in influencing government policymaking. According to Hsieh, the competition between the two major political parties, the (traditional) KMT and the Tangwai/DPP, has lasted for about twenty years, and the vote shares of the two in the Legislative Yuan elections have been stabilized (1997:23). On the other hand, the Nationalist party in Taiwan remains an oversized, richly endowed, and autocratically run political machine, which until recently was a bastion of one-party authoritarianism (Chu 1996:76). This authoritarian legacy is certainly not present in Hong Kong. As channels of political participation, Taiwan's political parties occupy different positions on different policy dimensions, and thus appeal to different segments of the society. While the Nationalist mainstream faction enjoys proximity to the Democratic Progressive Party on the national identity dimension, the non-mainstream faction and the New Party can also cooperate with the Democratic Progressive Party on issues related to socio-economic justice (Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996:477).
Voting
Before the introduction of electoral reform measures in the late 1970s, elections to local people's congresses were in general no more than political rituals, neither a reliable nor an effective method for ordinary citizens to influence government policy outcomes (Burns 1988:119). Therefore, only those with a strong desire to express their discontent or challenge the legitimacy of the regime abstained from voting (Shi 1999:1). During two decades of electoral reform, however, the nature and role of voting started to change slowly in mainland China. Although still far from becoming competitive, elections in today's China offer limited yet meaningful choices to ordinary citizens. In elections of deputies to the local people's congresses and in elections of work unit or village leaders especially, voting provides ordinary citizen with opportunities to signal their evaluation of local officials to the authorities, to remove unpopular leaders from their posts, or to damage those unpopular leaders?careers (Jacobs 1991:191). Manion also found that "[c]ongruence between village leaders and villagers is in significant part the result of an electoral connection that involves voter choice (1996:745). Therefore, although local elections in mainland China are still not a reliable way for people to influence government policymaking, voters may influence the selection of certain local officials by ousting leaders they dislike (Shi 1999:18).
In Hong Kong, after the electoral reforms in the 1990s, voting has become a much more powerful way for ordinary citizens to influence government outcomes than in the mainland. According to Baum, elections in Hong Kong are -- despite serious structural imperfections -- substantially free unfettered, and competitive affairs (1999:29), unlike the semi-competitive elections in mainland China. Hong Kong's local elections started in 1982, when 132 members of 18 newly established District Boards, local consultative councils, were elected (Miners 1998:36). The very low turnout at that time reflects the negligible role of voting as a form of citizen political participation. However, in the 1990s, as the Legislative Council, the law making representative assembly of Hong Kong, began to have some seats returned by universal suffrage and direct election, voting has come to play a more important role in ordinary citizen's influence on government policy outcomes. As Louie points out, among the various elections in Hong Kong, the Legislative Council direct election on the basis of geographical constituencies was politically the most significant because it provided the channel for the general public opinion to be expressed and the results of the election could have direct influence on policy and law making in the territory (1997:6). However, we have to be careful not to overemphasize the role and effectiveness of voting in influencing government. As Baum notes, the legislature in Hong Kong has little power to legislate, the chief executive is not directly elected by ordinary voters, but is immune from effective parliamentary oversight or accountability, and Hong Kong citizens lack any regular, institutionalized mechanism for ensuring government responsiveness (1999:1).
In Taiwan, the ongoing process of democratization offers competitive elections and competitive party system that make voting increasingly important in channelling ordinary citizens' preferences. Therefore voting in Taiwan is and will be more meaningful and effective than voting in both the mainland and Hong Kong. However, at the present stage of democratic development, Taiwan is still haunted by legacies of the past authoritarian rule. Specifically, voting in Taiwan is tarnished by widespread corruption and money politics. This corruption involved local faction-orchestrated election financing and campaigning; it institutionalized vote buying, relentless pork-barrelling, and outright bribes for replenishing campaign chests. KMT local party officials actually encouraged this structured corruption and even provided the legal shield for illegal vote-buying practices because this seemed to be a sure way to contain the electoral success of the opposition candidates. Vying for the political support of local elites, the KMT national leadership had no choice but to tolerate these illegal practices by a vast majority of its own members. In addition, expanded elections and an increasingly important parliament provided the business elite with new opportunities for political investment and influence buying in the policymaking process. The emerging political clout of the business elite eroded the autonomy of the state bureaucracy. Consequently, the Legislative Yuan became a horse-trading arena for state officials, party officials, and lawmakers who acted as surrogates for special business interests (Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996:463). It remains to be seen whether the newly inaugurated President Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party can effectively fight such a serious problem and make voting an important and effective channel of citizen participation in government policymaking.